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This paper considers abstract election games motivated by the United States Electoral College (USEC). 
There are two political parties, and the electoral votes in each state go to the party that spends the most 
money there, with an adjustment for a “head start” that one party or the other may have in that state. The 
states have unequal numbers of electoral votes, and elections are decided by majority rules. Each party has 
a known budget, and much depends on the information that informs how that budget is spent. Three 
situations are considered: (1) one party’s spending plan is known to the other, (2) spending is gradually 
revealed as the parties spend continuously in time, and (3) neither side knows anything about the other’s 
spending. The last situation resembles a Blotto game, hence the title. 
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1. Introduction 
 Before the advent of the secret ballot in the nineteenth century, it was common for 
citizens to be bribed to vote as instructed by the briber (Anderson and Tollison (1990)). 
While outright bribery of voters is no longer common, spending money to win popular 
votes seems to be an enduring and increasingly important part of politics. According to 
the United States Federal Election Commission (FEC, 2012), the total cost of presidential 
campaigns has been increasing at about 10%/year over the last several decades, 
considerably faster than inflation. Presidential elections cost billions of dollars, and the 
spending is effective. Levitt(1994) estimates that the cost of swinging 1/3 of 1% of the 
popular votes in a house election is about $100,000.  
 The demonstrable influence of money on politics is not generally thought to be a good 
thing. However, the impulse to optimize is irresistible. Given that money is an important 
determinant of politics, what follows about how given budgets should be distributed over 
the states? This paper is devoted to that question. We will examine only an extreme form 
of election where politics is reduced to a two-person zero-sum game where the party that 
spends the most money in a state wins that state’s electoral votes. Individual voters will 
not even be represented, nor will any aspect of politics other than money. However, we 
will consider games that differ in the information available to the two sides when 
spending decisions are made, and will find that the influence of this information is just as 
important as budget levels. 
  In reading this paper, the reader may wish to consult a Microsoft Excel ™ workbook 
named ECollege.xlsm, which can be found at the Downloads link at 
http://faculty.nps.edu/awashburn/ .  
2. The general model  
 Although we will approach the problem abstractly, we will continue to refer to the 
national voting entities as “states” because of the application to the USEC. We will also 
refer to the single critical resource as money, even though our analysis would apply 
equally well to any other scalar resource. The candidate’s time, for example, is a resource 
that must also be divided among the states. 
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 Let the number of states be n, a positive integer, and let the budgets of the two parties 
be b for the “Blue” party and r for the “Red” party. Each state has a prescribed positive 
number of electoral votes vi, and v = (vi) is the corresponding vector. The votes v are not 
necessarily integers. All electoral votes in each state go to the party that spends the most 
money there, and the party with the larger number of electoral votes overall wins the 
national election. Equivalently, let 
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= ∑ . Then any party that can capture more 
than V electoral votes will win the election.  
 We also include a bias vector z = (zi), where zi is a possibly negative monetary bias in 
favor of Blue, who will consistently be the maximizer in the games formulated below. 
We can reasonably expect that the parties will contest mainly in states where |zi| is not too 
large. These are the states that are “in play” (Merolla, Munger, and Tofias, 2005). Our 
goal is to investigate how the chances of success depend on z, v, b, and r, as well as the 
information available to the two sides as the campaign progresses. 
 Let xi and yi be Blue’s spending and Red’s spending in state i, respectively, and let x 
and y be the corresponding vectors. Also let I() be a scalar function of one real variable 
that is 1 for positive arguments, 0 for negative arguments, or 0.5 if the argument is 0. The 
number of electoral votes won by Blue is then 
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We are assuming in (1.1) that Blue and Red exactly split a state’s electoral votes should it 
happen that the argument of I() is 0. Blue wishes to maximize (1.1), and Red wishes to 
minimize the same quantity, so we have a zero-sum game.  
 The above definitions do not completely define the contest. Much depends on what we 
assume about who knows what and when as the two budgets are spent during the political 
campaign. We distinguish three cases: 
1. One party is for some reason compelled to reveal its budget allocations before the 
other party acts. Without loss of generality, we will assume the former party to be 
Blue. This is clearly a worst-case assumption for Blue, so we call it “Worst Case 
Blue”. It is covered in section 3. 
2. The parties continuously observe each other during the campaign, with each 
spending money in the knowledge of what the other party has done in the past. 
This case is “Continuous Public Spending”. It is covered in section 4. 
3.  Both parties secretly determine all budget allocations without any knowledge of 
the other’s allocations, and reveal them all at once. This case is “Secret 
Spending”. It is covered in section 5.  
With respect to the political process in the United States, case 2 comes closest to 
capturing the information flow that occurs during an actual campaign. The FEC (FEC, 
2012) aids this process by making state-by-state spending data continuously available. 
Case 1 is included because it bounds the effect of money, and case 3 is included to 
explore the effects of secrecy.  
 
3. Worst Case Blue  
 Here we consider only the bias-free situation (z = 0). The payoff to Blue in terms of 
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electoral votes won will be 
 
 max inf ( , , , )Ax y x y v 0  (1.2) 
 
The notation means that y is chosen knowing x. The “infimum” is necessary because 
there will typically be no minimizing y — Red should either make yi equal to 0 or to a 
number slightly exceeding xi. For any given x, define the function R(x) to be the 



















This function represents the smallest Red budget that will win the national election when 
Blue uses x. Variable ui is 1 if Red spends enough to capture state i, otherwise 0, and the 
constraint is to the effect that Red must capture more than half the electoral votes in order 
to win. Red’s budget must actually slightly exceed R(x) in order for him to capture all of 
his selected states.  
 There is also a minimal tying budget r(x) that can be found by replacing “>” in (1.3) by 
“≥”. The winning and tying budgets are equal if national ties are impossible, but in 
general we can only say that ( ) ( )r R≤x x .  
 Red’s problem of computing R(x) is in essence a knapsack problem, a fundamentally 
difficult type of optimization (NP-complete, to be precise, see Ahuja, Magnanti and Orlin 
(1993)). Blue has the additional problem of maximizing R(x), so we might call Blue’s 
problem a “worst case knapsack problem (WCKP)”. We will later outline a procedure for 
solving the WCKP, but first consider some attractive strategies for Blue and Red that, 
while not always optimal, are simple and effective. 
 The Blue strategy of making xi proportional to vi (call it x*) is attractive in the sense 
that it is simple, does not require that Red’s budget be known, and forces Red to make an 
investment proportional to the state’s value in order to win any state. The strategy also 
ensures Blue victory as long as Red has less than half of Blue’s budget. To prove this, let 








≡∑x . Then 
budget(x*, S) = b val(S)/(2V) — the proportionality factor 2V makes the overall Blue 
budget for all states be b. If budget(x*, S) < b/2, then it follows that val(S) < V; that is, 
Red will lose the election unless his budget is at least half of Blue’s.  
 In situations where national ties are possible, Red also has an easily described, widely 
effective strategy. Since ties are possible, Red can always find a collection of states S for 
which val(S) = V and also val(S′) = V, where S′ is the complement of S. Since 
( ; ) ( ; )budget S budget S b′+ =x x  regardless of x, Red can purchase either S or S′ as long as 
/ 2r b≥ , thus assuring at least a tie. Furthermore, the state with the smallest value of xi 
must be in one set or the other, and for that state /ix b n≤ . If / 2 /r b b n≥ + , then Red 
can guarantee victory by buying the small state plus the set that does not include it.  
 The above results mean that, roughly speaking, Red needs only about half of Blue’s 
budget in order to win. To find the exact tipping value for Red’s budget, we must solve 
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the WCKP.  
 In general, a strategy for Red in the WCKP can be expressed as a collection of winning 
subsets S1, …, Sm, for each of which ( )kval S V> . Red observes x and chooses the subset 
for which ( , )kbudget Sx is minimal, winning the election if and only if that budget is r or 
smaller. Given that collection of m subsets, Blue can maximize the budget required for 
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Our algorithm for solving WCKP is to alternate solving (1.3) and (1.4) until convergence 
occurs. After each solution of (1.4), the optimal x is input to (1.3), and a new winning 
subset S is determined as the set of states for which ui = 1. If S is already in the collection 
S1, …, Sm, then the algorithm terminates with the collection being optimal for Red and the 
last x being optimal for Blue. Otherwise S is added to the collection and (1.4) is solved 
again. There are only finitely many winning subsets, so the algorithm must eventually 
terminate. Let Rx  be the final value of x, and let R* be the final objective function of 
(1.4). Red will win if *r R> . 
 If Red’s budget is insufficient for victory, it may still be sufficient to avoid loss. Red’s 
strategy will again be a collection of subsets, but now we only require ( )kval S V≥ for 
each subset in the collection. Using the same column generation algorithm, we can now 
find rx and r* by consistently using the modified version of (1.3) where “>” is replaced 
by “≥”. Blue will win using rx  if *r r< . A tie will result if * *r r R< < , with one 
optimal strategy for Blue being Rx . 
 
Example 1: Consider a four-state example where v = (3,2,1,1) and 1b = . In spite of the 
relatively large value of v2, state 2 is tactically equivalent to states 3 and 4. We find that 
r(x*) = 4/7 = 0.57, but ( ) (0.4,0.2,0.2,0.2) 0.6r r= =rx  a larger value. We see that x* 
does not necessarily maximize r(x). Ties are not possible, so r* = R* = 0.6.  
 
Example 2: Assume v = (3,2,1) and 1b = . Ties are possible, so r(x) and R(x) are 
different functions. To maximize R(x), Blue should choose xR = (1,0,0), which forces 
Red to have a budget of more than R* = 1 to win. If r = 1, Red can tie, but cannot win. To 
maximize r(x), Blue might choose x*. The strategy x* will achieve a tie as long as 
r ≤ 2/3, but will lose against Red budgets larger than 2/3. The strategy 
(1/ 2,1/ 4,1/ 4)=rx  also maximizes r(x), and rx dominates x* in the sense that it 
guarantees at least a tie as long as r ≤ 0.75. 
 
Example 3: The USEC. For simplicity assume that b = 538, the total number of electoral 
votes. The 51 states (Washington D.C. is a state for our purposes) have a subset S 
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(indeed, many such subsets) for which val(S) = 269, so ties are possible. It turns out rx  
and Rx  are both equal to x*, with r* = 269 and R*= 270, as can be demonstrated using 
the column generation scheme outlined above. Sheets “BlueSheet” and “RedSheet” of 
ECollege.xlsm do this. The 20 winning subsets that constitute an optimal strategy for Red 
have the property that, for every x, at least one of them has a cost that does not exceed 
270. Blue will win using x* if r ≤269, or at least tie if 269 270r< ≤ . Blue will lose if 
r > 270.  
 
 We could modify (1.2)-(1.4) to deal with nonzero biases, but Worst Case Blue is of 
relatively low interest because of its extreme view of Red’s information advantage. Even 
if there were some kind of a Watergate incident where Blue’s spending plans were 
discovered by Red early in a political campaign, Blue could still observe Red’s 
subsequent spending and modify his own plans accordingly. Such considerations lead us 
to the next case. 
4. Continuous Public Spending  
 Here we imagine that each side can spend money in any manner consistent with 
obeying an overall budget constraint over a known election time period [0, T], except that 
the rate of spending per unit time can never exceed some large but finite number M. We 
assume that the two parties “continuously” observe each other’s spending. To be precise, 
we assume that the interval [0, T] is divided into an arbitrarily large number m of small 
“ticks”, and that spending within each tick is informed by knowledge of the other party’s 
spending in all previous ticks, but not the current tick. During each tick, each party can 
spend at most MT/m, dividing that amount over the states at will based on knowledge of 
the other party’s spending over previous ticks.  
 The above description is essentially that of a differential game (Isaacs, 1965). Dekel, 
Jackson and Wolinsky (2008) describe a different time-based political competition where 
the parties take turns making offers to individual voters, each of whom has his own utility 
function. Most other game-based treatments of political spending do not involve time, 
instead resembling the Secret spending case that will be treated below in section 5. 
4.1 No biases  
 We suppose first that z = 0. If b > r, Blue can always win by first choosing any subset S 
for which val(S) > V and then “taking” all the states in that subset. Taking a set of states 
is effectively the strategy of matching the other party’s allocations in that set, plus a little 
bit more to ensure victory. In detail, Blue first allocates an amount slightly exceeding 
MT/m to every state in S, using several ticks to do so if necessary and meanwhile 
ignoring Red’s allocations. The total budget required to do this is #( ) /buff S MT m= , 
where #(S) is the number of states in S. This leaves Blue a residual budget of 
'b b buff= −  which we can assume to be larger than r because m is arbitrarily large. This 
“buffer” is intended to prevent Red’s capturing part of S in the last tick where Blue 
cannot react to Red’s spending. Since b r′ > , Blue can still match Red’s spending within 
S, including any spending done by Red while Blue was accumulating the buffer, and will 
therefore be ahead by enough prior to the last interval to prevent Red from making any 
last-minute captures.  
 6 
 If r b> , then Red can similarly win by taking some winning set of states. In general, if 
at any time a party finds itself with a superior budget and a winning set of states in which 
there are no adverse biases, then that party can guarantee to win by taking those states.  
 Nothing is spent in states not taken. This is in contrast to guidance such as the “3/2 
rule” of  Brams and Davis (1974) that determines a priori how much money should be 
spent as a function of the number of electoral votes available. This same tension about 
whether to concentrate on a subset of the states exists in real political campaigns, witness 
Senator Goldwater’s decision in 1964 to abandon early plans to write off the big 
industrial northeastern states. Although we will see below that directly “taking” a set of 
states may not be optimal when there are biases, the optimal strategy will still concentrate 
all effort in a carefully selected subset of the states. If Goldwater was playing a game like 
the one described here, then he should have stuck with his early plans. 
 In summary, the probability of Blue’s winning is 1 if b r>  or 0 if r b> , and in either 
case an optimal strategy for the winner is to set up a buffer and then imitate the other 
party’s spending in a winning set of states. If r b= , then neither side can accumulate the 
required buffer, and symmetry demands that each side win half the time. We defer to 
section 5 consideration of the mixed strategies required to deal with that possibility.  
 
4.2 Biases, but no ties 
We next consider the possibility that the bias vector z is not 0. We will show that the 
introduction of a bias vector is equivalent to adding a certain amount B, possibly 




≡∑ . For simplicity, we 
temporarily assume that a tie in the national vote is impossible. A set of states S will be 
called a winner if ( )val S V> ; the only other possibility is that S is a loser. 
 The states can be partitioned into three sets P, Z, and N in which the bias is initially 
positive, zero, or negative. We deal first with the possibility that P is a winner. In that 


















∑  (1.5) 
The binary variables ui can be viewed as indicating which states remain in P; the rest are 
moved from P to N because Red spends enough in each of them to cancel the bias. If P′ is 
the set of remaining states where the bias is still positive, then the objective function of 
KP is bias(P′), and Red’s objective is to maximize that quantity subject to making sure 
that P′ is not a winner. Let B = bias(P) − bias(P′), a positive quantity that represents the 
aforementioned equivalent budget adjustment.  
 
Theorem: If P is a winner and if B is as defined above, then Red (Blue) can win the 
game if r is greater than (less than) b + B. 
Proof: We first show that Red can win the game if r b B> + . Red can assure this by first 
spending B to reduce P to P′. Since P′ is not a winner, it follows that the rest of the states 
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are a winner. The rest of the states have no positive biases, and Red still has more money 
left than Blue, so Red can take them.  
 Blue’s strategy for winning if r b B< + is slightly more complicated. Blue initially 
waits until Red has spent so much money in P that the remaining positively-biased states 
P′ are no longer a winner. By the design of program KP, Red will have to spend at least B 
in order to accomplish this (if Red does not do so, then Blue can win by taking P′). Once 
P′ is no longer a winner, Red will have at most r B C− − left, where C is −bias(N′) and N′ 
is the set of states that were originally in P, but which Red has effectively given a 
negative bias by spending more than necessary to remove them from P (C is a 
nonnegative number). Blue now spends C to neutralize the negative bias of all states in 
N′, leaving him with b − C. At this point all the states originally in P have a nonnegative 
bias, and Blue still has more money than Red, so he can take P. This kind of tactic for 
Blue will be called “waiting for B in P”.           QED 
 


















∑  (1.6) 
It is now Blue that is compelled to reduce N to the point where N′ is not a winner, where 
N′ is the set of states retaining a negative bias. The cost of this to blue is 
B = bias(N) − bias(N′), a negative quantity. The theorem remains valid, and can be 
proved similarly. If Blue can win, he does it by taking N. If Red can win, he does it by 
waiting for B in N.  
 The final case is where neither P nor N is a winner. In that case B is 0. The theorem 
remains valid, but the proof changes somewhat. Since N is not a winner, it follows that 
P + Z is a winner, and all states in that set have a nonnegative bias. If b > r, Blue can 
therefore win by taking P + Z. Likewise Red can win if b < r by taking N + Z . This 
completes the proof that introducing biases is equivalent to adjusting Blue’s budget, at 
least when ties are impossible. 
4.3 The general case 
 For completeness, we next consider the possibility where national ties are possible, as 
in the USEC. The reader may wish to skip this section—a quick summary is that the 
strategies of taking and waiting continue to suffice. 
 A given set of states S can now be either a winner ( ( )val S V> ), neutral ( ( )val S V= ) 
or a loser ( ( )val S V< ). Table 1 displays a matrix of the possibilities, together with the 
subsections that deal with them. 
 
 N is a loser N is neutral N is a winner 
P is a loser 4.3.1 4.3.3 4.3.3 
P is neutral 4.3.2 4.3.4 N/A 
P is a winner 4.3.2 N/A N/A 
Table 1: Applicability of the four subsections 
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 4.3.1 P and N are both losers 
 If P and N are both losers, then B = 0 and the argument is as in the case where ties are 
impossible. Whoever has the most money wins the election.  
 4.3.2 N is a loser, but not P. 
 In addition to program KP, we must also consider problem KPP where the symbol “≤” 
is replaced by “<”. The objective function of KPP is ( )bias P′′ , where P′′ is a loser. Let 
( ) ( )B bias P bias P′= −  and let ( ) ( )PB bias P bias P′′= − . Necessarily PB B≤ because KP is 
a relaxation of KPP. If Pr b B> + , then Red can win by taking all the states that are not in 
P′′. If Pb B r b B+ < < + , then Red can tie by taking all the states not in P′. Blue can also 
tie when Pb B r b B+ < < + by waiting for Red to spend BP in P; if Red spends less than 
that, then the remaining positive states are not a loser, and if Red spends that amount or 
more, then Blue can at least tie by taking P. Finally, if r b B< + , Blue can win by 
waiting for Red to spend B in P and then taking P+Z (P + Z is a winner because N is a 
loser).  
 4.3.3 P is a loser, but not N 
 Let KNN be similar to KN, except that the symbol “≤” is replaced by “<”. The 
objective function of KNN is ( )val N ′′ , where N′′ is a loser. Let ( ) ( )B bias N bias N ′= −  
and let ( ) ( )NB bias N bias N ′′= − , with NB B≥ because KP is a relaxation of KPP. 
Arguing as in 4.3.2, we can conclude that Blue can win if Nr b B< + , that either side can 
force a tie if Nb B r b B+ < < + , and that Red can win if b B r+ < . 
 4.3.4 Neither P nor N is a loser 
 In this case we necessarily have ( ) ( )val P val N V= = . Take B = 0 and let BP and BN be 
computed as in 4.3.2 and 4.3.3. Following the same line of argument, we conclude that 
either side can force a tie if N Pb B r b B+ < < + ., and that Red (Blue) can win if r is larger 
than the upper limit (smaller than the lower limit). 
 
Example 4: If (2, 1, 2)= − −z  and (2,1,1)=v , then section 4.3.4 applies and BP = 2, 
BN = −1. The game value is “tie” if both sides start with the same budget. 
 
Example 5: The USEC with standard bias 
 Let Blue be the Democrats and Red be the Republicans, and assume that one party or 
the other will win any presidential election. It is well known that certain states are biased 
in favor of one party or another. To quantify the bias, we update the methodology of 
Owen, Lindner, and Steffen (2008). There are three steps: 
 
1. For each state k, determine the latent fraction fk of the two-party popular vote that 
goes to the Republicans. This is done by discounting the measured fractions in the 
last 5 presidential elections with a discount factor of 0.8. The discount factor and 
the measured fractions for years preceding 2008 are taken from Owen, Lindner, 
and Steffen (2008). The measured fractions for 2008 come from the Federal 
Elections Commission (FEC, 2010). 
2. Let dk be the latent number of excess Democratic popular votes. We set 
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(1 2 )k k kd c f= − , where ck is the size of the two-party popular vote in the 2008 
election.  
3. Let k kz ad= ,where a is half the cost of switching a popular vote from one party 
to the other, assumed in this example to be $10. The resulting vector z is the 
standard bias in the Democrats’ favor, positive in Blue states and negative in Red 
states. It is shown in millions of dollars ($M) on sheet “Bias” of the workbook 
ECollege.xlsm. 
  
With standard bias, ( ) 281val P = , so the states in which Blue has an advantage are a 
winner and section 4.3.2 applies. Program KP has the solution $0.213MB = , and PB B= . 
The budget offset B is the cost to the Republicans for winning Ohio, a Blue state with 18 
electoral votes, leaving P′a loser with only 263 votes. Blue has an advantage, but it is a 
small one relative to most state biases. The Blue bias in California alone, for example, is 
$19.5M. 
 
5. Secret Spending 
 Section 4 assumes that the number of time ticks is arbitrarily large, whereas this 
section, in essence, deals with the possibility that the whole election time interval consists 
of a single tick. In that case both parties must allocate budgets entirely in the dark about 
the other party’s allocations. It would be equivalent to dispense with time altogether. The 
election is reduced to a two-person zero-sum game where each side secretly allocates its 
money to the states.  
 We can distinguish two different TPZS games that we will call BG(v,z,b,r) and 
EG(v,z,b,r), depending on the payoff function. In BG (which is short for Blotto Game), 
the payoff function when x and y are employed is A(x,y,v,z); that is, Blue’s utility is the 
number of electoral votes in his favor. The payoff in EG(v,z,b,r) is I(A(x,y,v,z) − V), 
which is either 0 (Red wins), 1 (Blue wins) or 0.5 (tie). Laslier and Picard (2002) refer to 
BG as the plurality game and to EG as the tournament game. It is important to distinguish 
between the two because the payoff in BG is a simple sum, whereas the payoff in EG is a 
nonlinear function of that sum. The general idea in the following is to first solve BG, and 
then try to find a way to use BG to approximate EG. 
 
5.1 Blotto games and relaxations 
 There has been considerable previous work on games like BG, most of it in a military 
context (see Eckler and Burr (1972)). The name comes from the fictional Colonel Blotto, 
who must solve the problem of dividing his four units among four fortresses when he 
doesn’t know the defensive allocations of his opponent (Phillips, 1933). Although 
Blotto’s name was not applied to the class until after World War Two (the first use of the 
term known to the author is Tukey (1949)), an analysis by Borel (1921) is already a 
solution of a Blotto game. Borel deals with continuous allocations and majority-rules 
decisions in each of three areas. Subsequent papers along this line include Gross and 
Wagner (1950), Galiano (1969), Roberson (2006) and the present work. Most previous 
work assumes that all areas (states) are identical, whereas the present work does not. 
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Notable BG-like politico-economic publications are those of Snyder(1989), Myerson 
(1993), Laslier and Picard (2002), Laslier (2002) and Kvasov (2007). Hortala-Vallve and 
Llorente-Saguer (2011) consider a nonzero-sum game where the areas are not identical, 
specifying payoff functions for which optimal strategies are pure, rather than mixed. With 
the payoff function of either BG or EG, we expect optimal strategies to be mixed. 
 Let random variables Xi and Yi stand for the two players’ allocations to area i, and also 
define the random variable sgn( )i i i i iV v X z Y≡ − − , so that Blue’s expected utility is 
1 1




E V E V
= =
=∑ ∑ . The equality is justified because finite sums and expected values 
commute, and the equality is important because computing ( )iE V requires only the 
marginal distributions of Xi and Yi. However, the decoupling of states is imperfect in 
BG(v,z,b,r) because we still have the requirement that the allocations must have fixed 
sums over all the states. We will approach BG by first considering a “very relaxed” 
Lagrangian relaxation VRBG(v,z,λ,µ) where the two players are not required to meet 
fixed total budgets, but only to pay for their allocations to the various states at the rates λ 
(Blue) or µ (Red). The analytical beauty of VRBG(v,z,λ,µ) is that the states decouple 
completely, and can therefore be considered separately. Myerson (1993) and Hart (2008) 
consider similar relaxations of Blotto games, presumably for the same reason.  
5.1.1 The very relaxed game VRBG(v,z,λ,µ) 
 It suffices to consider a single generic state with value v and bias z. If Blue allocates X 
and Red allocates Y, then the payoff to Blue is ( )vI X z Y X Yλ µ+ − − + . The allocations 
are required to be nonnegative, but are otherwise unconstrained. Blue, for example, will 
keep X smaller than v/λ not because there is a constraint to that effect, but because he 
would otherwise be spending more than the state is worth. 
 The strategy spaces are not compact and the payoff function is not continuous, so there 
is no theorem guaranteeing that a value for VRBG even exists. A solution does exist, 
however, as is proved by exhibiting it in the appendix. Here we record only the results 
needed in the continuation. With optimal distributions for X and Y, define 
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In each of the three formulas constituting (1.7), the first equality is by definition, and the 
second is an observation of symmetry where the roles of Red and Blue are reversed and 
the sign of z is changed. We will not prove the symmetry observations. 
 Define the dimensionless constants /  and /z vδ µ ρ µ λ= = . Results are trivial if 
|δ| ≥ 1, since both allocations are 0, with the state going to Blue (Red) if δ is positive 




0.5  if 1






λ µ δ δ ρ
ρ
+ ≤




0.5  if 1






λ λ µ δ δ ρ
ρ
+ ≤




( +0.5) if 1






µ λ µ δ δ ρ
ρ
+ ≤




All three functions are continuous across the boundary where 1δ ρ+ = . If z < 0, the 
symmetry observations determine all three functions, or see the appendix for explicit 
expressions. The value of the game is EV EX EYλ µ− + .  
 The solution of VRBG(v,z,λ,µ) is simply a matter of summation over the states. 
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Equations (1.11) complete the solution of VRBG(v,z,λ,µ).  
5.1.2. The relaxed game RBG(v,z,b,r) 
 We next consider a game RBG(v,z,b,r) where the players are required to observe the 
constraints b and r, respectively, but only on the average. We can solve this game as long 
as we can find a pair (λ,µ) such that equations (1.12) are satisfied: 
 
 
( , , , )











If we can find such a pair, then the strategies optimal in VRBG(v,z,λ,µ) are also optimal 
in RBG(v,z,b,r), and the value of RBG(v,z,b,r) is EV(v,z,λ,µ). The proof that it suffices 
to solve (1.12) is the proof that Lagrangian relaxation is a fail-safe technique (Everett, 
1963). A proof in a game theory context can be found in Penn (1967) or Washburn 
(2003), along with a technique for constructing bounds out of near misses. 
 
Example 6: Suppose v = (4,2,1) and z = (3,0,0). We solve the game VRBG(v,z,2,1), 
finding from (1.11) that 2.25 0.5 0.25 3EV = + + = , 0.125 0.25 0.125 0.5EX = + + = , and 
1.75 0.5 0.25 2.5EY = + + = . Should it happen that (b, r) = (0.5, 2.5), the solution of the 
game is at hand. Blue’s advantage in state 1 is outweighed by the fact that Red has a 
 12 
budget that is five times as large, resulting in Blue taking only 3 out of seven total 
electoral votes, on the average. If (b, r) is not (0.5, 2.5), then we have completed only the 
first step of finding the right pair (λ, µ), and will have to continue the search.  
 
Example 7: The USEC with standard bias and equal budgets. We take µ = 0.2, and 
search for the λ that makes the budgets equal. The result is that (λ, µ) = (0.1957, 0.2000) 
and b = r = $1282M. On the average Blue wins 275.3 electoral votes, on the average. As 
in example 5, the standard bias favors the Democrats. For details see sheet “LamMu” of 
Ecollege.xlsm.  
 
 If z = 0, RBG(v,z,b,r) can be solved directly without dealing with (1.12). For both 
sides, the average allocation to any state should be proportional to the state’s value, and 
the resulting probability that Blue wins the state is 
 
0.5 /  if 
( , )
1 0.5 /  if 
b r b r
BW b r
r b b r
≤
=  − ≥
. (1.13) 







BW b r v
=
∑ . 
 In summary, we have reduced the problem of solving RBG(v,z,b,r) to a problem of 
solving, at worst, two simultaneous equations in two unknowns. 
 
5.1.3 The Blotto game BG(v,z,b,r) 
 The only difference between BG(v,z,b,r) and RBG(v,z,b,r) is that the two players are 
required to restrict expenses to budgets with certainty in the former, rather than on the 
average. The solution of RBG(v,z,b,r) provides the marginal distributions of the 
allocations for both players, so the initial question is existential: does there exist a joint 
distribution of allocations over all the states that has the marginal distributions known to 
be optimal in RBG(v,z,b,r), and also has the property that the sum of the allocations is a 
constant? More briefly, we ask whether the marginal distributions of RBG(v,z,b,r) are 
“playable” or not. If Blue’s (Red’s) marginals are playable, then the value of RBG is a 
lower (upper) bound on the value of BG. If both are playable, then BG has been solved.  
 In all three of the following examples, we consider symmetric situations where 0=z .  
  
Example 8: Suppose v = (4,2,1) and r = b = 3.5. The solution of RBG is that for each 
player the marginal distribution of the allocation to state i should be a uniform random 
variable in the interval [0, vi], for all i. However, neither player can have an allocation to 
state 1 that exceeds 3.5, so the strategies of RBG are not playable in BG. The value of 
BG is clearly 3.5 by symmetry, but the optimal strategies are unknown. 
 
Example 9: Suppose v = (1,1,1,1,1) and r = b = 2.5. In RBG, all allocations should be 
standard uniform random variables, so the playability question amounts to “is there any 
way of sampling five standard uniform random variables so that their sum is always 
exactly 2.5”? The answer is yes, so BG has been solved. In fact, the answer is yes as long 
as the number of equal-valued states exceeds 1. We will refer to such collections as 
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“wheels”, since one method of play exploits the fact that the sum of the projections of the 
spokes of a wagon wheel is always a constant, regardless of the wheel’s orientation.  
 
Example 10: The USEC. Suppose that r = b = 269, which is half of the total number of 
electoral votes. The solution of RBG is that, for both sides, every state should have a 
uniform distribution of spending on the interval [0, vi]. There are many ways of playing 
these marginal distributions in BG, but perhaps the simplest consists of first partitioning 
the states into setpairs and wheels. A “setpair” is two disjoint sets of states for which the 
total number of votes in each set is the same number k. California (55) and Washington 
(12) might be one of the two sets, whileTexas (38), and New York (29) might be the 
other, with 67k = . A setpair can be played by selecting one standard uniform random 
number U. If a state in the first set has votes v, then the allocation to that state is vU . If a 
state in the second set has votes v, then the allocation to that state is (1 )v U− . All 
allocations are uniform over the desired limits, while the total allocation for the setpair is 
exactly k. It is easy to partition the states into setpairs and wheels. One method of doing 
so is shown on sheet “NetBias” of ECollege.xlsm. That method attempts to maximize the 
number of setpairs and wheels. Since ties are possible in the USEC, a more direct method 
would involve only one setpair where 269k = , and no wheels. 
 
 In example 10, it is so easy to find ways of playing the RBG strategies that one might 
(and the author does) write off the playability issue even when there are biases or unequal 
budgets, at least when the biases are small and the budgets not too unequal, as is the case 
in reality. Playability is one of those difficulties that is at its worst in small, unbalanced 
problems such as example 8, but which goes away in larger examples such as example 
10. Beale and Heselden (1962) opine that RBG may actually be more realistic than BG, 
since budgets are usually known only approximately in reality. 
 In summary, our computational strategy for solving BG(v,z,b,r) is to first solve (1.7) 
for λ and µ. The optimal strategies for VRBG(v,z,λ,µ) are then also optimal in 
RBG(v,z,b,r) and (subject to playability concerns) BG(v,z,b,r). 
5.2 The game EG(v,z,b,r) 
 EG(v,z,b,r) is not a Blotto game because the payoff is not a sum of payoffs from the 
individual states. Still, EG is so similar to BG that one hopes for some way of exploiting 
the relationship. There are cases where this is possible, although the USEC turns out not 
to be one of them. 
5.2.1 BG versus EG in the USEC 
 Consider the USEC with no biases and equal budgets. The value of BG(v,0,269,269) is 
269, as demonstrated above, and both sides use a marginal distribution in state i that is 
uniform in [0 vi] for all 51 states. By using his optimal strategy in BG(v,0,269,269), Blue 
can guarantee to receive at least 269 electoral votes, on the average, as long as Red’s 
spending does not exceed 269. If Blue uses that strategy in EG(v,0,269,269), one might 
expect that Blue could guarantee to win the game half the time, or nearly so. However, 
Blue will almost always lose the game if he employs that strategy against a clever Red. 
 Here is a strategy for Red that will usually win if Blue mistakenly uses his optimal BG 
strategy in EG. Red can buy any state for certain by spending an amount of money equal 
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to the state’s electoral votes, since that is the upper limit of Blue’s spending. With a 
budget of 270, Red could buy California and enough other states to make up 270 electoral 
votes. This would produce a winning number of electoral votes, but spends one unit too 
much of money. Red can correct the budgeting problem by spending only 54 in 
California, one less than the number of its electoral votes. Since Blue’s allocation to 
California is uniform in [0, 55], the probability of Blue’s winning California is 1/55, and 
this is also the probability of Blue’s winning the national election. On the rare occasions 
when Blue wins California, he has a large surplus of electoral votes (323 to 215). On the 
common occasions when he loses California, he loses narrowly (268 to 270). The rare 
large victories compensate for the occasional small losses in BG, but not in EG. Red’s 
strategy could be described as “lose big and win small”, and the reason for California’s 
centrality is that one can lose bigger in California than in any other state. The value of 
EG(v,0,269,269) is 0.5, so there must be a way for Blue (or Red) to guarantee winning 
half the time. However, the strategy that is optimal in BG(v,0,269,269) does not 
accomplish that, even approximately. 
 In spite of this disappointment, it may be useful to explore the consequences of both 
sides playing their BG optimal strategies in EG. The BG strategies at least incorporate 
reasonable adaptations to biases and budgets, and, as a practical matter, it is unlikely that 
either side will be so confident as to employ strategies such as the one suggested for Red 
above. An approximation to the probability of Blue winning can be found by assuming 
that the BG allocations to each of the 51 states are all independent. Let pi be the 
probability that Blue wins state i, and let random variable W be the number of electoral 
votes won by Blue. Then 
51
1
( ) i i
i
E W m v p
=




( ) (1 )i i i
i
Var W v p pσ
=
≡ = −∑ . These 
equations are consequences of our independence assumption and the binary nature of the 
outcome in each state. Since there are 51 states, W should be approximately normal by 
the Central Limit Theorem, so the probability that Blue wins is 
 269( 269) ( )mP W
σ
−
> ≅ Φ , (1.14) 
where ()Φ  is the CDF of the standard normal distribution. The solution of the Blotto 
game determines pi in every state, and (1.15) determines the probability that Blue wins.  
 
Example 11. The USEC: With the same assumptions as in example 7, the probability of 
Blue winning is 0.55, again showing that the Democrats have an advantage. If instead of 
the standard bias we assume z = 0, then ( , )ip BW b r=  in every state. Figure 1 shows 
how Blue’s win probability depends on the budget ratio when z = 0. See sheets “LamMu” 
and “PWin” of ECollege.xlsm for details of these calculations. 
5.2.2. Small EG games 
 Since BG seems to be at best an imperfect guide to playing EG, we are left with little 
choice but strategy enumeration if we wish to solve EG games. In this section we 
consider some small EG games in the hope of establishing an insight into the nature of 
optimal strategies. We consider only games where z = 0. 
 Games with only two states are of no interest, since the party with the larger budget can 
win (or at least avoid losing) by spending all of it in the larger state. Therefore consider 
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the game EG((1,1,1),0,1,1). This game has three identical areas and a unit budget for each 
side. Its counterpart BG((1,1,1),0,1,1) has a solution that has been known since Borel 
solved it in 1921. Blue uses a mixed strategy where Xi is uniform in [0, 2/3] for i = 1,2,3, 
and Red behaves similarly. When Blue uses this strategy, he wins either 1 or 2 areas with 
equal probability, no matter what Red does, so he can guarantee an average payoff of 1.5. 
The same strategy also guarantees that he will win EG half the time, since winning EG is 






Figure 1: Probability that Blue wins the USEC as a function of the budget ratio. 
  
 Next consider the game EG((v1,v2,v3),0,1,1), where v1, v2, and v3 are such that a triangle 
with those sides can be drawn. This game is strategically equivalent to EG((1,1,1),0,1,1), 
since either game will be won by whichever player captures two states, and therefore has 
the same optimal strategies. However, we could not have found the optimal EG strategy 
by first solving BG and then proving that the same solution is optimal in EG. Any 
optimal strategy in BG will have marginal strategies proportional to electoral votes 
(Roberson, 2006), and is therefore not optimal in EG unless all states are equal. If no 
triangle with sides (v1,v2,v3) is possible, then it is optimal in EG (but not in BG) for both 
sides to spend the entire budget in the largest state, and the result is a tie.  
 We finally turn to EG(2,1,1,1),0,5,5), a game with no biases, equal budgets, one big 
state and three small ones. This is perhaps the smallest interesting example where the 
states are not equal. The big state is sufficient with any other state, but will lose by itself. 
The RBG game has uniform allocations in all states, with the upper limit in state i being 
2vi. If Blue uses any strategy with those marginal distributions, Red can win 75% of the 
time by buying one small state and committing the rest of his budget (3) to the large state. 
Therefore the BG strategy is not optimal in EG. We seek a strategy that is optimal, or at 
least one that will win more than 25% of the time. Our method will be to make various 
















 We consider two kinds of approximation. Both players are restricted to using integer 
allocations in game Gb,r, while Hb,r is a nonsymmetric game where Blue is restricted to 
integers, but Red is permitted to use any allocations (integer-valued or not) that sum to r. 
The value of Gx,x is of course 0.5. Our interest in Hx,x is that any mixed strategy for Blue 
establishes a lower bound on the value of EG(2,1,1,1),0,x,x) because Red’s strategy 
choice is not artificially restricted in Hx,x. 
 Table 2 shows G5,5 and its solution when both budgets are 5, with the first row and 
column being labels for the pure strategies of the two players. A shorthand is used in 
naming strategies: 3002 is the strategy of using 3 on the large state and 2 on one of the 
small ones, with the lucky small state being randomly chosen among the three. On 
account of the symmetry among the three small states, the last three digits in any pure 
strategy can be shown in nondecreasing order, with the understanding that all six 
permutations are equally likely when the mixed strategy is played. If Blue plays row 
1022 against Red’s column 4001, then Blue will lose the big state, and can only hope to 
win all three small states. This can happen only if the 0 in 1022 lines up against one of 
the 0s in 4001, which happens 2/3 of the time. Blue must also win the resulting coin flip, 
which happens half of the time, so the resulting entry in the game matrix is 1/3. Blue’s 
optimal mixed strategy is computed by solving a linear program, and shown in the last 
column of Table 2. The average payoff against each column is shown in the last row, and 
of course all of these numbers are at least 0.5, the value of the game. 
  
 5000 4001 3011 3002 2111 2012 2003 1112 1022 1013 1004 0122 0113 0014 0005 0023  x() 
5000 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.75 0 0.5 0.75 0 0.5 0.5 0.75 0 0 0.5 0.75 0.5 0 
4001 0.25 0.5 0.83 0.92 0.5 0.75 0.92 0.33 0.67 0.75 0.92 0.17 0.33 0.75 0.92 0.67 0.39 
3011 0.5 0.167 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.92 1 0.58 0.83 0.92 1 0.33 0.58 0.92 1 0.83 0 
3002 0.25 0.083 0.5 0.5 1 0.92 0.92 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.92 0.67 0.67 0.83 0.92 0.75 0.16 
2111 1 0.5 0.25 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.75 1 1 1 0.5 0.75 1 1 1 0.1 
2012 0.5 0.25 0.08 0.08 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.92 0.92 0.96 1 0.75 0.83 0.96 1 0.88 0 
2003 0.25 0.083 0 0.08 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.92 0.92 1 0.83 0.83 0.92 0.92 0 
1112 1 0.667 0.42 0.17 0.25 0.08 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.83 0.92 1 1 1 0.31 
1022 0.5 0.333 0.17 0.17 0 0.08 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.92 1 1 1 0.92 0 
1013 0.5 0.25 0.08 0.17 0 0.04 0.08 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.92 0.96 1 0.96 0 
1004 0.25 0.083 0 0.08 0 0 0.08 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.92 0.92 1 0 
0122 1 0.833 0.67 0.33 0.5 0.25 0 0.17 0.08 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.04 
0113 1 0.667 0.42 0.33 0.25 0.17 0.17 0.08 0 0.08 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 
0014 0.5 0.25 0.08 0.17 0 0.04 0.17 0 0 0.04 0.08 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 
0005 0.25 0.083 0 0.08 0 0 0.08 0 0 0 0.08 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 
0023 0.5 0.333 0.17 0.25 0 0.13 0.08 0 0.08 0.04 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 
 0.591 0.5 0.58 0.5 0.5 0.52 0.55 0.5 0.65 0.68 0.76 0.5 0.62 0.86 0.94 0.81 1 
Table 2: The solution of G5,5. The first column and first row are the pure strategies 
for Blue and Red, respectively. The last column is an optimal mixed strategy for 
Blue, and the last row is the resulting payoff against each of Red’s strategies. The 
interior numbers are probabilities that Blue wins.  
 
 The marginal distribution of the number of units allocated to the large state in the 
optimal strategy of G5,5 is (4,31,10,16,39,0)/100 on the allocations (0,1 2,3 4,5), to be 
compared to the uniform Blotto strategy of (20,20,20,20,20,0)/100. Both strategies agree 
that one should never allocate all 5 units to the big state, but not about much else. One 
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can summarize the rest of the optimal allocations in G5,5 as “If the big state gets 3 or 
more, then randomly pick some single small state for the remainder. If the big state gets 2 
or less, then divide the remainder as evenly as possible over all three small states”. 
However, the idea that a player will either concentrate on one small state or treat them all 
as evenly as possible does not hold up in larger versions of the game. In G9,9 when both 
budgets are 9, for example, the optimal mixed strategy includes 4113.The game G9,9 is 
not shown here because it is too large, but the interested reader can find it on sheet “G99” 
of the workbook ECollege.xlsm. That workbook also includes sheets for G5,5 through G8,8. 
No exploitable pattern emerges, at least not to the author, as finer divisions of the budgets 
are permitted. 
 In Hb,r, Red is not restricted to spending his budget in integer amounts. Let 
1 2 3 4( , , , )y y y y=y  be a possible strategy for Red, and suppose that y is composed entirely 
of integers. If any component of y matches Blue’s allocation, then the tie is resolved by 
flipping a coin to decide the winner in that state. Red will be tempted to increase that 
component by a very small amount, say ε, in order to convert potential ties into outright 
victories. He cannot do this without decreasing the allocation in some other state, thereby 
converting potential ties in that state into outright losses, but that same decrease can 
safely be large enough (3ε, to be precise) to permit increases in all states other than the 
one decreased. In effect, Red has the option of giving up one unit of budget in order to 
win all ties. This observation permits an analysis of Hb,r by conventional means, since it 
is now possible to list all of Red’s strategies: some strategies sum to r and have ties 
decided by coin flipping, while the rest sum to r − 1 and have all ties won by Red. The 
value of H9,9 turns out to be 0.39. In that game Red avoids the strategies that sum to r, 
always finding it attractive to sacrifice one unit of budget in order to win all ties. The 
detailed game matrix is displayed and solved on sheet “H99” of Ecollege.xlsm.  
 Thus the best known strategy for Blue in the game EG((2,1,1,1),0,x,x), a game whose 
value is 0.5 by symmetry, can only guarantee to win 39% of the time. At least this 
number is larger than 25%, but it is disappointingly far from 50%. The prospects of 
solving EG((2,1,1,1),0,x,x) by this brute-force technique are not encouraging. The 
prospects of solving the larger EG game that corresponds to the USEC are even less so. 
6. Summary 
 We have considered three cases where electoral politics is just a matter of money:  
 
1. Worst Case Blue.  Blue must spend before Red, and must consequently have 
about twice Red’s budget to be competitive. The problem of finding the exact 
smallest Blue budget that will ensure victory is identified as the WCKP, and an 
algorithm for solving it is offered for the case where there are no biases. 
Randomization is not involved in optimal play.  
2. Continuous Public Spending. This is probably the closest of the three cases to 
reality. Both parties watch each other closely, spending money in continuous time 
until election day. A complete solution is given, except for the possibility of equal 
budgets. The impact of biases in the various states is equivalent to a budgetary 
offset. Again, randomization is not involved. 
3. Secret Spending. Both parties spend money in secret, and then the election is 
decided by comparing spending in the various states. Randomization is essential 
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to optimal play. A blotto game BG is solved, more or less, and used to 
approximate the probability that Blue wins the EG election. We have no evidence 
that the approximation is a good one (the opposite, in fact), and are able to find 
rigorous solutions of EG games only when the number of states is small. The EG 
game that corresponds to the USEC continues to resist solution.  
 
 For budgets near parity, the influence of money is extreme in case 2. This may partially 
explain why Republicans and Democrats often have budgets that are near parity in actual 
campaigns, since the consequences of falling behind are disastrous.   
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Appendix: Solution of a two-person zero-sum Blotto game  
 Blue and Red are the maximizing and minimizing players, respectively. Blue chooses 
x, a nonnegative number, and Red chooses y, another nonnegative number. The payoff to 
Blue is ( , ; , , , ) ( )A x y v z vI x z y x yλ µ λ µ= + − − + , where v, λ and µ are positive numbers 
and z is any real number. Blue (Red) chooses x (y) knowing everything but y (x). The 
function I() is 1 for positive arguments, 0 for negative arguments, or 0.5 if the argument 
is 0. 
 We first observe that, since ( ) ( ) 1I w I w− + = for all w, we have 
( , ; , , , ) ( , ; , , , )A x y v z v A y x v zλ µ µ λ= − − . It follows that it suffices to consider only 
nonnegative values for z, so we assume z ≥ 0 in the following. From here on we refer to 
the objective function as A(x,y), since the rest of the parameters are known to both sides.  
 Let z
v
µδ = . If 1δ ≥ , then ( ,0)A x v≤ and (0, )A y v≥ , so the value of the game is v and 
0 is an optimal strategy for both sides. From here on we assume δ < 1. 
 Let random variable X be Blue’s choice, let F(x) be the cumulative distribution function 
of X, and let A(F, y) be Blue’s expected payoff against Red’s choice of y. We will find an 
optimal strategy for Blue among the class of distributions where X is 0 with probability 
1 − p, or, else uniform between 0 and some upper limit. Figure 1 shows a sketch of the 






= . The slope of the CDF over the interval [0, vp/µ] is required to be µ/v, so the 
only free parameter is p, which must be in the interval [0, 1]. 
.   
 Since E(X) does not depend on y, we temporarily remove that term from the objective 
function by considering ( ) ( , ) ( )f y A F y E Xλ≡ + . The worst choice of y from Blue’s 
viewpoint will minimize this function. The probability that X + z exceeds y is 
1 − F(y − z). Therefore 
 if 
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v y y z
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= − − + =  ≡ + < ≤ +
 
 






about slope, which makes f(y) constant over the interval (z, z + vp/µ]. If y < z, then the 
minimizing y is clearly 0. Red will not find it attractive to make y = z (a slightly larger 
value would be better) or larger than vp/µ, since f(y) reverts to increasing at slope µ in 
that region. Therefore the minimum of f(y) over all nonnegative y is the smaller of v and 
g(p). Blue wants to choose p to maximize the function min( , ( )) ( )v g p E Xλ− . Consider 
first the problem of maximizing ( ) ( )g p E Xλ− . This is a quadratic function of p for 
which the maximizing value of p can easily be shown to be µ/λ. If g(µ/λ) exceeds v, then 
p should instead make g(p) = v, which is done by making p = 1 − δ. Thus the maximizing 
value of p is the smaller of 1 − δ and µ/λ, depending on whether 1µδ
λ
+ ≥ . Substituting 
these values into the formula for A(F,y), we find that, for all y, 











 − − + ≥≥ 
 + + ≤
. 
Let ρ = λ/µ, and define the function 
21 0.5(1 ) /  if 1
( , )
0.5  if 1
Val
δ ρ δ ρ
ρ δ
ρ δ δ ρ




Then the above observations show that Blue can guarantee a payoff of at least ( , )vVal ρ δ
, regardless of y.  
 We next consider mixed strategies for Red. Let random variable Y represent Red’s 
choice, and let G(y) be the CDF of Y. There is clearly no good argument for Red’s 
choosing y in the open interval (0, z), so we consider only CDFs of the form shown in the 
figure below. 
 
Random variable Y is 0 with probability 1 − q, or otherwise uniform over the interval 






= +  . Let A(x,G) be the expected 
payoff if Blue uses x against G. The probability that x exceeds Y − z is G(x + z). For  





z + vq/λ 
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which does not depend on x. Since Blue has no motive to choose x outside of that 
interval, Red should choose q to minimize 
2




− + + , another quadratic 
equation. The minimizing value is (1 )q λ δ
µ
= − , or else 1 if that product exceeds 1. The 
product exceeds 1 when 1.µδ
λ
+ <  Substituting the minimizing q into the formula for 
A(x,G), we find 











 − − + ≥≤ 
 + + ≤
 
In other words, Red can guarantee that the expected payoff will not exceed ( , )vVal ρ δ , 
regardless of x. This is the same value that Blue can guarantee, so ( , )vVal ρ δ is the value 
of the game, and the optimized mixed strategies F and G are optimal for Blue and Red, 
respectively. 
 Let E(I) be the expected value of the random variable I(X + z − Y), so that 
 
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )vVal vE I E X E Yρ δ λ µ= − + . 
 
It is sometimes useful to have expressions for each of the three components of the game 
value. We record below the correct expressions when X and Y are determined by the 
optimal mixed strategies derived above, including formulas for z ≤ 0.   




= = .  
For  1δ ρ+ ≤ , ( ) 0.5 , ( ) 0.5 ,  and ( ) ( 0.5)E I E X v E Y vρ λ ρ µ δ= = = +   
For 1δ ρ+ ≥ , 
2 2 21 (1 ) 1( ) 1 , ( ) ,  and ( )
2 2 2
E I E X v E Y vδ δ δλ µ
ρ ρ ρ
− − −
= − = =  
 For z ≤ 0, define z
v
λδ = −  and λρ
µ
= .   
For 1δ ρ+ ≤ , ( ) 1 0.5 , ( ) 0.5 ,  and ( ) ( 0.5)E I E Y v E X vρ µ ρ λ δ= − = = +  
For 1δ ρ+ ≥ , 
2 2 21 (1 ) 1( ) , ( ) ,  and ( )
2 2 2
E I E Y v E X vδ δ δµ λ
ρ ρ ρ
− − −
= = =  
The redundant definitions on the boundaries where z = 0 and 1δ ρ+ = are to emphasize 
that all three expected values are continuous functions across those boundaries.
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